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EC Merger Control in the 1990s: An
Overview of the Draft Regulation
Frank L. Fine*
The wave of mergers and acquisitions experienced during the last
several years in the United States is now on its way to Europe.' The
Commission of the European Communities ("Commission") recently re-
ported that cross-border mergers and stock purchases of majority share-
holdings in the European Community ("EC" or "Community") have
surged from 29 in 1983-1984 to 52 in 1985-1986.2 Acquisitions by non-'
EC companies, particularly United States and Japanese firms, are also
likely to increase dramatically. It was no surprise, for example, that the
recent linkage between Nomura Securities, a Japanese company, and
Wasserstein, Perella, a spin-off of First Boston Corporation, was in-
tended to give Nomura access to the European market.'
The Community has become a field ripe for merger activity largely
because both European and non-European companies are keen to posi-
tion themselves in anticipation of "1992," the target date for the integra-
tion of the EC Internal Market. In the absence of a strong, uniform
counterweight to this pressure to merge, competition in the Community
could suffer or become distorted. Merger mania may mean that stagnant
national economies and high unemployment could become the legacy of
1992.
* Dobson, Sinisi & Associates, Brussels Office. This Article is based on the speech delivered by
the author on Sept. 12, 1988 at the Seventh Annual International Antitrust Conference in Cam-
bridge, England. The editors of the JOURNAL would like to thank Mr. Fine for his invaluable assist-
ance in organizing this Symposium.
1 See, eg., In Merger Scramble, Companies Redraw Corporate Map of Europe, Int'l Herald
Tribune, Nov. 10, 1988, at 12, col. 1; "Get Big" the Cry as 1992 Approaches, Fin. Times, Nov. 21,
1988, at 1, col. I (special insert "Top 500: 1988").
2 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIrXEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY, at 218, point 319 (1987).
3 Fin. Times, July 28, 1988, at 1, col. 7.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:513(1989)
The Commission, and, in particular, the Directorate General for
Competition ("DG IV"), recognized the need for merger control at the
EC level long before the Commission began its initiative to unify the
market. In 1973, the Commission submitted to the Council of Ministers
("Council") a proposal for the regulation of large-scale mergers ("Draft
Regulation"). 4 This legislation aimed to submit to "systematic control"
those concentrations which might "prevent effective competition." 5
Despite the need for EC merger control legislation, the Council of
Ministers until now has been divided by national concerns, principally
involving claims of sovereignty. The Commission, in turn, has tried to
accommodate the Council with amendments in 1981,6 1984,7 and 1986,8
which have steadily increased the threshold for the applicability of the
Draft Regulation.
There is now a great deal of pressure upon the Council to adopt the
Draft Regulation, of which the latest draft was submitted to the Council
in November 1988.9 The Council is not only cognizant of the need for
EC legislation to confront the expected merger and acquisition blitz in
the Community, but it also is being threatened by DG IV's aggressive
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty1° to mergers.1" The
Commission used Article 86 to prohibit a merger on only one occasion.' 2
Until recently, the Commission consistently maintained that Article 85
was never intended to be applied to mergers. 3 In light of these develop-
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertak-
ings, 16 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973).
5 See id. at Preamble, paras. 7, 13.
6 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 25 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 36) 3 (1982).
7 Amendment to the Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 27 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 51) 8 (1984).
8 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 29 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 324) 5 (1986).
9 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 32 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989)[hereinafter Amended Draft Regulation].
10 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, at 47-49.
11 European Report, Part III, at 3 (Mar. 5, 1988).
12 Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 215, 12 COMMON MKT.
L.R. 199. In Continental Can, a United States company, Continental Can, established a Delaware
subsidiary, Europemballage, for the purpose of acquiring an EEC competitor, TDV. Europembal-
lage, which maintained an office in Brussels, Belgium, subsequently obtained 80% of the shares of
TDV. The Commission found that this acquisition infringed Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, because
the acquisition amounted to an abuse of Continental Can's dominant position in the Common Mar-
ket. Although the European Court annulled the Commission decision for lack of evidence, the
Court affirmed the exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction. Id. at 241-42, 12 COMMON MKT. L.R.
at 221-22.
13 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CON-
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ments, it is likely that the Draft Regulation, in a form approximating
that of the April 1988 text, will be adopted by the Council in the coming
months. For this reason, it would be useful to analyze the scope of the
Draft Regulation.
I. SCOPE OF THE DRAFT REGULATION
The Draft Regulation covers several types of transactions which
deal with the control of "concentrations." Article 3(1) of the Draft Reg-
ulation defines a "concentration" as a merger or acquisition of control,
whether by the purchase of stock or assets "by contract or by any other
means of the whole or parts" of one or more companies.14 As is apparent
from this definition, friendly as well as hostile bids are covered. More-
over, a concentration will result from the acquisition of control over a
division of a company. The definition of "control," for the purpose of
determining whether a concentration has taken place, is a flexible one.
Control would result from the ownership of all or part of the assets of
another company, from the power to influence the composition or voting
of the Board of Directors, or more generally, from the power to manage
the affairs of the other company. 5 Joint ventures would not result in a
concentration where their object or effect "is the coordination of conduct
of independent undertakings."16 Partial mergers, or joint ventures in
which the parties cease competing with respect to the products con-
cerned, would be subject to the Draft Regulation.17
The foregoing are the types of transactions covered by the Draft
Regulation. However, only those having a "Community dimension" are
within the scope of the legislation.18 The test for Community dimension
has two parts. The first part is geographical, and the second part is
quantitative.
The geographical test may be satisfied by three means. Under the
first method, a merger would have a Community dimension if at least
two of the undertakings effecting the merger have their "principal field of
Community activities" in different Member States.19 The phrase, "prin-
CENTRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET 33-36 (1966); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, SEvENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 31, points 29-32 (1978)(reporting the
Commission's findings on a complaint concerning the European zip-fasteners industry).
14 Amended Draft Regulation, supra note 9, at art. 3(1). The scope of this Article extends to
"concentrations" within the meaning of Article 3(1). For convenience, the more popular term,
"merger," shall be used throughout this Article.
15 Id. at art. 3(3).
16 Id. at art. 3(2)(emphasis added).
17 Id.
18 Id. at art. 1(I).
19 Id. at para. 10 of Preamble.
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cipal field of Community activities," is of vital importance in determining
whether a merger would be subject to the Draft Regulation. This term of
art, however, has not been defined formally. The Member State of incor-
poration will probably be irrelevant in determining whether this require-
ment has been satisfied. The Commission probably will employ a test
akin to the "nerve center" test used in the United States. Under this test,
the Commission would look to the Member State containing the greatest
concentration of the firm's administrative, sales and manufacturing
facilities.
The second means of satisfying the geographical test assumes that
the parties effecting the merger have their principal field of Community
activities within the same Member State. Under these circumstances, the
merger would nonetheless have a Community dimension if one of the
parties to the merger has "substantial operations," such as a subsidiary
or direct sales in another Member State.20
The third formula for establishing the geographical part of Commu-
nity dimension assumes that the companies effecting the merger do not
have their principal field of activities in the Community. The merger of
such companies nevertheless may satisfy the geographical test where
such a merger has an "effect within the common market."21 This third
"effects" formula, like the other two, only establishes the geographical
side of a two-part test for subject matter jurisdiction. The Commission is
not attempting to legislate away the jurisprudence of the European Court
on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Community. As the reader may
recall, in the September 1988 Wood Pulp22 judgment, the Court did not
endorse a pure "effects" theory.23 Rather, it asserted that non-EC com-
panies, having no agents, offices or subsidiary in the Community, could
be subject to Community jurisdiction where the agreement or transaction
is implemented in the Community.24 Thus, even though a merger be-
tween two non-EC companies having no EC contacts may have effects in
the Community, such effects, alone, would appear insufficient to assert
personal jurisdiction over the parties.
The implementation of the geographical test, in its present form,
would result in a number of logistical problems. These problems stem
from the absence of guidelines for the implementation of the test. The
large multinational companies typically involved in a merger could have
20 Id.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A Ahstrdm OY v. E.C. Commission, COMMON MKT. L.R. ANTI-
TRuST Supp. 901, 940-41 (Dec. 1988).




most of its manufacturing facilities in one Member State, its administra-
tive and sales offices in another, and its greatest EC turnover occurring in
still a third Member State. In which Member State are the principal
activities of the company located? A similar ambiguity occurs in the de-
termination of whether a company has "substantial operations" in a
Member State other than the one in which its principal field of activities
is located.
The above criticism suggests that the geographical test in its present
form is unworkable for the purpose of establishing a cross-border dimen-
sion to mergers. In order for the test to operate effectively, this provision
needs to be substantially revised or at least supplanted by an explanatory
memorandum. An alternative approach may be to determine the locus
of a company's EC activities on the basis of the Member State in which
the company's EC headquarters, if any, are located and in which the
company's greatest EC turnover occurs. If they are not in the same
Member State, then each of the two Member States concerned would be
deemed the locus of the company's EC activities.
Putting aside the problems inherent in the current formulation of
the geographical test, it is clear that this test, with its emphasis on Com-
munity activities, could apply to non-EC firms seeking to acquire compa-
nies in the Community. Let us take a simple hypothetical where a
United States or Japanese company, which we will call Company X, has
its greatest EC investment in France where it maintains a subsidiary.
Thus, we are assuming that this subsidiary's principal facilities are also in
France. Let us further assume that Company X wishes to acquire Com-
pany Y, a West German firm whose principal administrative, manufac-
turing and sales facilities are located in West Germany. If Company X
acquires Company Y through its French subsidiary, the merger would
satisfy the geographical criteria of the Draft Regulation because the prin-
cipal field of Community activities of the French subsidiary are in
France, whereas those of Company Y are in West Germany. Moreover,
jurisdiction could be obtained over Company X by means of the "single
economic entity" theory. By this theory, the anti-competitive conduct of
an EC subsidiary can be imputed to its non-EC parent where the latter in
fact controls the subsidiary.25
Let us change the hypothetical slightly by assuming that Company
25 The European Court has affirmed the use of this test in the following cases: Imperial Chemi-
cal Indus. v. Commission, 1972 E. COMM. Cr. J. REP. 619, 622, 11 COMMON MKT. LR. 557, 629;
Continental Can, 1973 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. at 242, 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 221; Instituto
Chemioterapico Italiano Spa v. Commission, 1974 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 223, 253, 13 COMMON
MKT. L.R. 309, 342-43.
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X will cause its West German subsidiary, Z, to make the acquisition of
Company Y. Subsidiary Z has its principal field of Community activities
in West Germany and has no facilities, subsidiaries or direct sales outside
West Germany. By using this tactic, does Company X eliminate the
problem of Community dimension? Or will the Commission look
through the transaction and conclude that Company X is the true pur-
chaser? If the Commission can look through the transaction, Company
X's substantial contacts in France would create the necessary cross-bor-
der dimension. It is unclear whether the single economic entity theory
would be an appropriate means of establishing a cross-border dimension
to the transaction. It seems likely that the Commission would rely on the
theory especially where the acquiring company forms or uses an existing
subsidiary in order to circumvent the Draft Regulation. In any case, the
single economic theory would be an appropriate means to obtain jurisdic-
tion over Company X.
In a third hypothetical, let us assume that Company X purchases
Company Y directly, that is, without using an EC subsidiary as the vehi-
cle for accomplishing the merger. Suppose also that Company X's prin-
cipal facilities in the Community are located in France. In this scenario,
the single economic entity theory may not be appropriate due to the lack
of involvement of Company X's French subsidiary in the merger. In
both Continental Can26 and Commercial Solvents,2 7 jurisdiction over the
non-EC companies was premised on the use of a subsidiary or controlled
company with EC contacts as an instrumentality for the parents' anti-
competitive objectives.2 8 However, even if the single economic entity
theory were inappropriate in this factual setting, the merger is in fact
implemented in the Community. In these circumstances, therefore, the
Commission would undoubtedly employ the qualified "effects" doctrine
recently approved by the Court in Wood Pulp29 in order to obtain juris-
diction over Company X.
Curiously, the current version of the Draft Regulation does not cre-
26 Continental Can, 1973 E. COMM. Cr. J. REP. at 242, 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 221-22.
27 Commercial Solvents, 1972 E. COMM. Cr. J. REP. at 254, 13 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 343.
28 In Commercial Solvents, a United States company, Commercial Solvents owned, at the time of
the Commission's investigation, 50% of Instituto, an EEC firm. Commercial Solvents also had a
50% right of representation in the Instituto board of directors. Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.
COMM. Cr. J. REP. at 226, 13 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 313. However, the president of Commercial
Solvents was a voting chairman of the Instituto board. Id. These facts established Commercial
Solvents' control of Instituto. The Commission attributed Instituto's refusal to supply an important
EEC competitor of Commercial Solvents to Commercial Solvents' control of the board. Commercial
Solvents subsequently was fined under Article 86. Id. at 227, 13 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 318. This
infringement was upheld by the Court. Id. at 250-54, 13 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 340-44.
29 Re Wood Pulp, COMMON MKT. L.R. ANTITRUST SupP. at 940-41.
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ate a Community dimension for this scenario. Obviously, Company X
and Company Y do not have their principal activities in different Mem-
ber States.. Likewise, they could not be classified as having their principal
activities in the same Member State but with substantial operation in
another Member State. Nor do both Company X and Company Y have
their principal activities outside the Community. The problem is that
this merger, having one foot inside and the other outside the Community,
does not fit any of the Draft Regulation's criteria of Community dimen-
sion. This omission was probably unintended and should be remedied in
the final version.
The quantitative aspect of "Community dimension" is provided in
Article 1(2) of the Draft Regulation." According to this provision, a
merger would lack a Community dimension in one of the following three
circumstances:
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the "undertakings con-
cerned" is more than 1 billion ECU; and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of
the undertakings concerned is more than 100 million ECU;
(c) unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than
75% of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within the same Member
State.31
"Undertakings concerned" is a special term, and includes not only the
firms effecting the merger, but also those companies which control or
which are controlled by the firms effecting the merger.32
Several points should be made concerning these quantitative aspects
of Community dimension. First, the November 1988 version of the
Draft Regulation lowers considerably the threshold requirements of the
April 1988 proposal.33 The April version required at (b) above, that the
aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertaking to be acquired be at
least 50 million ECU.34 Similarly, the April version would have ex-
cluded a merger from the scope of the legislation where the companies
effecting the merger, as opposed to all the undertakings concerned, have
75% of their EC-wide turnover within the same Member State.35
Second, regarding the turnover requirement, the turnover to be cal-
culated is not based on the relevant product or products, but instead,
30 Amended Draft Regulation, supra note 9, at art. 1(2).
31 Id.
32 Id. at art. 5(4).
33 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) in the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4 (1988).
34 Id. at art. 1(3)(b).
35 Id. at art. 1(3)(C).
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represents all products sold by the relevant undertakings. 36 Third, the
Draft Regulation does not account for currency fluctuations. These
items should be addressed in the Commission's guidelines accompanying
the final draft.
II. PRIOR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
The geographical and quantitative tests described above determine
whether a merger has a Community dimension, and thus falls within the
scope of the Draft Regulation. When any merger is within the scope of
the Draft Regulation, the Commission must be notified of it prior to its
implementation. 37 The rule has no exceptions. The pre-merger notifica-
tion procedure applies regardless of whether the takeover is friendly or
hostile.38 Failure to notify the Commission of a merger could result in a
fine of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertakings con-
cerned.39 Significantly, the test of whether a duty to notify arises is dif-
ferent from that of whether the merger is in fact anti-competitive.4 The
size of the fine for failure to notify depends on whether the party or par-
ties deliberately or negligently failed to consider that the merger had a
Community dimension. Thus, that the merger in fact has no anti-com-
petitive effects is not a defense to a charge of omission to notify, nor is it a
factor in the setting of fines.
The danger of confusing the duty to notify with the evaluation of the
merger itself is exemplified by the case of the 25% presumption. Under
the Draft Regulation, a concentration is presumed to compatible with
the Common Market where the EC market share of the undertakings
concerned (thus including affiliates of the parties effecting the concentra-
tion) is less than 25%.41 If a merger satisfies this 25% presumption, it is
not exempt from the notification requirement. As explained above, all
mergers falling within the geographical and quantitative criteria of the
Draft Regulation must be notified by the Commission. This 25% pre-
sumption is one aspect of the evaluation given to concentrations already
satisfying the threshold requirements for notification.
36 Amended Draft Regulation, supra note 9, at art. 5(1).
37 Article 4(1) of the Draft Regulation states that, "Concentrations as referred to by this Regula-
tion, whether or not they form the subject-matter of an agreement, shall be notified to the Commis-
sion before they are put into effect." Mergers must be jointly notified by the companies concerned,
whereas acquisitions of control must be notified by the acquiring party. Id. at art. 4(2).
38 See id. at art. 4(1).
39 Id. at art. 13(2)(b).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 42-48.
41 Amended Draft Regulation, supra note 9, at para. 15 of Preamble.
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III. APPRAISAL OF MERGERS
Mergers within the scope of the Draft Regulation are subject to a
two-stage examination. During the initial stage, the Commission must
decide whether the facts warrant an investigation.42 The Commission
has one month after notification of a merger to make this threshold deci-
sion.43 No time limit applies to the initial evaluations of mergers which
come to the Commission's attention via a third party complaint or other
sources.
The second phase of the inquiry depends upon a finding by the
Commission that a merger is within the scope of the Draft Regulation.
In all such cases, whether the Commission is notified of the merger or
not, it is required to initiate a formal proceeding in order to establish
whether the merger is compatible with the Common Market. 44 The test
of compatibility is whether the merger would "create or strengthen a po-
sition as the result of which the maintenance or development of effective
competition is impeded in the common market or in a substantial part
thereof."'45 The factors to be considered include the market shares of the
companies, the structure of the markets affected, barriers to entry and
the effect on supply and demand.'
An exemption is available under Article 2(3) for mergers whose ben-
efits may outweigh the anti-competitive effects. The factors to be consid-
ered are the contribution of the merger to improving production and
distribution, to promoting technical or economic progress or to improv-
ing the EC competitive structure.47 However, a merger satisfying these
criteria would only be authorized to the extent that it is not indispensable
to the implementation of the merger and does not create the possibility of
eliminating competition with respect to a substantial part of the goods or
services concerned.48
As in the case of the first phase of the inquiry, the Draft Regulation
would impose time limits on the completion of the stage involving formal
proceedings. Not surprisingly, mergers of which the Commission has
been notified are the beneficiaries of these provisions. The Commission
must make a decision authorizing the merger as compatible with the
Common Market within one month from the date of initiation of the
42 Id. at art. 6(l)
43 Id. at art. 6(3).
44 Id. at arts. 6(1).
45 Id. at art. 2(3)(emphasis added).
46 Id. at art. 2(1).
47 Id., at art. 2(3). The last of the factors, "improving the competitive structure" seems incon-
gruous with the prerequisite finding that the merger would hinder competition.
48 Id.
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proceedings.4 9 Decisions granting an exemption or prohibiting a merger
must be made within four months.50 No deadlines are fixed for complet-
ing an investigation of a merger of which the Commission has not been
notified. The lack of deadline reveals the leverage the Commission in-
tends to exert in order to compel notification.
An important aspect of this appraisal procedure are the rules on the
suspension of mergers. Mergers falling with in the scope of the Draft
Regulation must be suspended pending the Commission's decision on
whether to initiate proceedings.51 If proceedings are opened, the Com-
mission is authorized to extend the suspension of the merger until the
Commission makes a final decision.52 These rules, however, are subject
to several exceptions. First, a public takeover or exchange bid may be
implemented if the Commission has been notified by the date of its an-
nouncement, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting
rights attached to the shares in question.53 Secondly, a suspension may
be shortened or waived in order to prevent serious damage to one or
more of the parties.54
IV. POWERS OF INFRINGEMENT
The Draft Regulation grants extensive enforcement powers to the
Commission. Under Article 8, the Commission may block a merger, or-
der divestiture, or authorize the merger subject to conditions. The Com-
mission may impose fines not only for failing to notify, but also for
implementing the merger before the Commission has completed its initial
inquiry or subsequent investigation. 5 Similarly, the Commission may
fine the parties for implementing a merger in defiance of a decision
prohibiting it.56 The fine in each case, except for failure to notify, may
reach a maximum of 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertakings
concerned.5 7
To ensure that mergers within the scope of the Draft Regulation are
properly notified and evaluated, Article 10 grants the Commission au-
thority to obtain all "necessary information" from the Member States
49 Id. at art. 9(1).
50 Id. at art. 9(2).
51 Id. at art. 7(1).
52 Id. at art. 7(2).
53 Id. at art. 7(3).
54 Id. at art. 7(4).
55 Id. at art. 13(2)(a).
56 Id.
57 Id. at art. 2.
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and from the companies themselves.5 8 In addition, Article 12 grants the
Commission investigating powers to conduct searches of business prem-
ises, to examine books and business records, to "take or demand" copies
from such books and records, and to ask for on-the-spot "oral explana-
tions." It may offend the sensibilities of lawyers in the United States to
learn that the Commission requires no search warrant under EC law.
The reason is that the Commission acts as a hybrid judge and prosecutor.
Nevertheless, United States companies with offices in the Community
have to live with these draconic powers. To facilitate the enforcement of
these rules, the Commission is establishing a Task Force to monitor
large-scale mergers.
V. EFFECTS ON OTHER EC AND NATIONAL ANTITRUST RULES
Assuming that the Draft Regulation is adopted and in effect, how
would it affect Articles 85 and 86 and national antitrust laws? Since one
of the main reasons for the Draft Regulation is to provide a "one-stop"
authorization procedure for large-scale mergers, the Draft Regulation
should preempt the application of other antitrust rules, both at the Com-
munity and at the national level.
If a merger is within the scope of the Draft Regulation, the Commis-
sion would not be permitted to apply Articles 85 and 86. This much is
clear from the face of the Draft Regulation. Article 22 strips the Com-
mission of its power to apply Regulation 17, the enforcement arm of Ar-
ticles 85 and 86. However, Regulation 17 only applies in a Commission
investigation. Whether Regulation 17 would prevent the use of Articles
85 and 86 inprivate actions in the national courts is unclear. In any case,
the Member States would be prohibited from applying their national an-
titrust legislation to mergers having a Community dimension, unless em-
powered by the Commission.59 Such limited cases would arise where the
Commission has found that a merger is compatible with the Common
Market.' Thus, where the Commission has prohibited or exempted a
merger, the Member State authorities could not apply their national anti-
trust rules to approve the merger.
If a merger is outside the scope of the Draft Regulation, the Com-
mission and the national courts could apply freely Articles 85 and 86.
However, due to the huge commitment in resources expected in the en-
58 In United States practice, Article 10 would be akin to a request to produce documents or to
answer questions.
59 Amended Draft Regulation, supra note 9, at art. 20(2).
60 Id. at art. 8(2). The rationale behind this exception is to permit the Member States to regulate
mergers affecting national markets.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:513(1989)
forcement of the Draft Regulation, the Commission is unlikely to initiate
proceedings under Articles 85 and 86. Nonetheless, theoretically the
Commission could open proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 since a
"Community dimension," as defined in the Draft Regulation, is not nec-
essary under these articles. Similarly, the national authorities are free to
apply their antitrust rules to mergers outside the scope of the Draft Reg-
ulation. In short, a two-tier system of EC and national antitrust law
would continue to apply to such mergers.
In closing, the November 1988 version of the Draft Regulation
should be viewed as a later rather than final draft of the legislation. Fur-
ther modifications are likely of such controversial items as the financial
thresholds, the requirement of pre-notification, compulsory suspension
and the preemption of national antitrust rules. Nevertheless, the Novem-
ber 1988 Draft Regulation constitutes a meaningful blueprint for the
functioning of EC merger control in the event that the Draft Regulation
is adopted.
